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ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL NETWORKS: 
VILLAGE SAVINGS AND CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS (VISACAs) IN THE GAMBIA" 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE VISACAs IN THE GAMBIA 
1. Introduction 
Village Savings and Credit Associations (VISACAs) were launched four years ago in 1988 
as a pilot project in The Gambia. The primary objective of these village banks is to collect local 
savings and make loans to individual villagers or groups. A total of six VISACAs function currently 
in villages in the Sapu area, located in the McCarthy Island South Division (MID-South), about 350 
kms East of Banjul, the capital city of The Gambia. The first VISACAs were created in 1988 as a 
pilot project with the Gambian Ministry of Agriculture and managed by Centre International de 
Developpement et de Recherche (CIDR) a French NGO (Non governmental organization), in 
cooperation with Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KFW) of Germany and the Jahally-Pacharr Rice 
Project. 
The Jahally-Pacharr small holders rice project of the Sapu area was originally launched in 
1984 through support from IFAD, the ADB and the governments of Holland and West Germany. 
The project was designed to improve rice yields in the region. With irrigation, up to two rice 
harvests are possible in a year. Income from the sale of rice was expected to provide farmers with 
surplus liquidity and a continuous flow of income from which the VISACAs would be able to mobi-
lize their savings. According to one of the Jahally-Pacharr project managers, the Sapu area produces 
30 percent of all the rice consumed in The Gambia and accounts for 80 percent of all domestic rice 
production in the country. The population of the Sapu area is a good representative sample of the 
major ethnic groups present in The Gambia with 32.5 percent Fula, 32.5 percent Mandinka, 18 
percent Sarahole and 17 percent Wolof. 
The distance from Jahally to Pacharr is 15 kms. This area comprises 73 villages. Most 
villages are members of the rice irrigation project and enjoy ample access to pump-irrigated fields. 
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Within the Jahally-Pacharr area, six villages were chosen to participate in the VISACA program. 
They are: Ahallulie (Wolofvillage), Sare Ngai (Fula village), Tabanani and Wellingara (Mandinka 
villages), Jahally and Madina (Sarahole villages). Four of the VISACA villages are members of the 
rice project. One village (Ahallulie) recently pulled out of the Jahally-Pacharr program because of 
the difficulties of maintaining their rice fields from such a long distance. An additional VISACA 
village (Tabanani) is currently waiting to be included in the rice project (after wells are dug to 
irrigate their fields). Besides rice cultivation, farmers in Jahally-Pacharr also grow groundnuts, 
millet, sorghum and raise livestock. Rice cultivation was traditionally a women's activity in The 
Gambia. But with the advent of the Jahally-Pacharr project, men have become actively involved in 
rice growing because of its potentially promising source of substantial revenues. A few NGOs that 
are present in the Sapu area are also helping women to set up vegetable gardens as a means to 
diversify their crops and income generating sources. 
2. Internal Regulations of the VISACAs 
Internal regulations of VISACAs are discussed and established at a general assembly of all 
villagers. The villagers decide upon membership conditions, interest rates for deposits and loans, 
and management procedures and practices. Membership consists of both individuals as well as kafo 
groups. Furthermore, members of kafo groups can and frequently do have individual accounts as 
well. Each VISACA has a management committee whose responsibilities consist of: ( 1) keeping 
members informed of VISACA activities; (2) expanding membership; (3) encouraging members to 
open savings accounts; and (4) evaluating and granting loans. Each management committee is 
composed of six to ten people, with an equal number of men and women chosen by all villagers 
during the preliminary meetings. Two to three cashiers are also selected to carry out bookkeeping 
responsibilities. Cashiers receive a small financial compensation for their services from the interest 
income generated by their VISACA. Committee members, on the other hand, are volunteers and do 
not receive any salary. All committee members and cashiers receive some initial numeracy training 
offered by the CIDR. The accounting practices used in the VISACAs have been kept simple during 
this initial phase. However, they will progressively incorporate some conventional double 
bookkeeping entries in the future. 
Membership fees have been sufficiently low (10 and 20 dalasis) to allow everyone the 
opportunity to become a member. Membership is required to make deposits and/or receive loans. 
Some VISACAs require their members to make a one-time deposit of any amount in order to 
become eligible for future loans. 1 In general, VISACAs do not try to match the deposits of a 
particular person with his/her loan request. Instead they try to match the term structures of assets 
and liabilities of the VISACA as a whole. Loans are made out of the three types of savings 
instruments, i.e. three, six, and nine months "term deposit" accounts. Twelve-months deposit 
accounts exist but have not received too much attention from VISACA members. Non interest 
1 It is interesting to note that CIDR did not ask the villagers to tie savings behavior to credit. However, on their 
own initiative the village VISACAs (4 out of6) implemented the requirements of some prior savings before receiving 
a loan. The CIDR wisely did not interfere. 
3 
bearing current account deposits (i.e. demand deposits) are also available but are not used for loan 
purposes, i.e. the VISACAs hold l 00 percent reserves on demand deposits. 
Annual interest rates are set through discussions at open meetings including all villagers. It 
is interesting to note that these villagers after discussion voted to set relatively high positive real 
rates of interest. Four VISACAs set annual deposit rates at 20 percent and loan rates at 40 percent. 
Two VISACAs established 40 percent annual deposit rates and 60 percent annual loan rates. Thus, 
the gross intermediation margin reaches 20 percent between deposit and loan rates in all VISACAs. 
This just happens to be the same margin recorded by commercial banks in The Gambia, though 
banks achieve this with lower deposit and loan rates. These high positive real rates of interest allow 
the VISACAs to effectively compensate for inflation (currently 10 percent) and to generate interest 
earnings to cover incidental expenses and, most importantly, create a growing surplus to service new 
loans. Initial Capital is made up of membership fees which are quite low and would not offer at 
present adequate collateral to external partners such as commercial banks. These rates are set on an 
annual basis so that a 6 month loan would pay 20 percent interest at a 40 percent annual rate and a 
six month deposit would earn l 0 percent interest at a 20 percent annual rate. 
3. VISACAs and Credit Unions: Operational Philosophies Compared 
In many respects VISACAs are similar to the generalized model of Credit Unions (CUs). 
Nevertheless there are some operational differences that need to be pointed out. Credit Unions are 
organized under rules and regulations that are fairly uniform wherever they exist. The member's 
share contribution in a CU is crucial in determining eligibility and size of loan. Credit union 
members have a right to a loan equivalent to a multiple of their share (frequently two to one). At 
times deposit accounts in some CUs are used (in addition to shares) as the basis to establish the loan 
multiple. In this case the deposit account is blocked during the life of the loan. These loan to share 
multiples for individual loans are not part of the VISACA's loan practices. The VISACAs do not 
have any explicit loan size criterion for individual borrowers based on shares or deposits. However, 
it is clear that they try to balance the term maturity of their volume of deposits to the same maturity 
(or less) for a comparable volume of loans. Thus, a volume of three months loans (or less) is 
matched (i.e. supported) by a comparable volume of three months deposits, six months loans with 
six months deposits, etc. Hence the VISACAs engage in an institution-wide term matching of assets 
and liabilities instead of an individual client criterion between loan and savings. Also non-members 
can own a deposit account in a CU in contrast to a VISACA where only members can hold deposits. 
Finally, current accounts (i.e. demand deposits) do not exist in CUs as they do in VISACAs. 
The sharpest difference between VISACAs and CUs pertains to interest rate policy. As 
pointed out earlier, VISACAs currently charge annualized short term loan rates of 40 or 60 percent. 
Credit unions, on the other hand, generally charge a 12 percent annual interest rate on loans and 
usually require installment payments of principal plus one percent interest each month. VISACAs 
only expect payment at the end of the loan term. However it should be pointed out that the effective 
interest rate on CU loans turns out to be much higher than the stated 12 percent annual rate since the 
deposited share is in practice rarely withdrawable, hence it represents an additional cost (above and 
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beyond the 12 percent annual interest rate) to secure a loan. This adjustment notwithstanding, 
VISACA loan and deposit rates are much higher than those normally found with credit unions. 
Another pertinent difference lies in the much broader role for non-member villagers to 
influence interest rates and other loan and deposit terms and conditions in the VISACAs in open 
village assemblies. Credit Unions, in contrast, restrict these decisions to their membership. The 
more open village approach creates local legitimacy and acts as a member recruitment vehicle. This 
is no doubt feasible in the relatively small sized villages in which the VISACAs currently operate. 
It would likely be less feasible in larger villages or towns. 
There is also usually a formal limit on the size of a single loan in a credit union whereas this 
is not explicit in a VISACA, although it would appear that an implicit threshold is recognized. 
Double entry bookkeeping is the standard in all CUs (though sometimes imperfectly administered) 
whereas more rudimentary single entry procedures are currently practiced in the VISACAs. Any 
realized net earnings in CUs are given to shareholders as dividends or paid out as patronage refunds 
to borrowers. In VISACAs net interest earnings are used for further loan activity. In VISACAs, net 
interest earnings are used for further loan activity and mainly for strengthening of VISACA 
reserve/capital. Finally, kafo groups as well as individuals can be members in VISACAs while 
individual membership alone characterizes credit union membership. 
II. MEMBERSHIP GROWTH 
The first VISACAs opened in October 1988 were Jahally and Sare Ngai. Three more 
VISACAs, Ahallulie, Wellingara and Madina were launched one year later in 1989. Tabanani was 
the final VISACA founded in February 1991. Some VISACAs accept members residing in neigh-
boring villages. As of December 1991, a total of 1305 villagers and kafo groups were members of 
the six VISACAs of the Sapu area, with 676 women, 574 men and 55 kafo groups (Table 1.) 
according to the VISACAs membership files. 
Kafos are groups of individuals that have common interests and organize for diverse reasons. 
Originally, kafos were an intrinsic part of every Gambian village and were the symbol of social 
cohesion as well as solidarity as every villager automatically belonged to a men's or women's kafo. 
They have been gender specific and involved mainly in community activities (digging public wells, 
helping neighbors in the fields, building or repairing houses, cleaning up village streets, etc.). A 
number of kafos originally also engaged in credit activities. Today, kafos vary widely in size and 
nature (e.g. soccer club kafos, political party kafos, gardening kafos, NGO kafos, etc.). Some kafo 
groups have even crossed the gender line and have male as well as female members (e.g. VISA CA 
committee kafos, health center kafos, etc.). 
By March 1992, the total membership of the six VISACAs had reached 1384 villagers and 
groups with 52 percent women, 44 percent men and 4 percent kafos. Of the 56 kafos in the six 
VISACAs, the majority (21 kafos) were found in just one village while the other five VISACAs had 
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an average of seven kafos. The VISACAs as a group recorded a growth in membership in 1989 
roughly 2.6 times their 1988 membership. In large part this was due to more villages joining the first 
two VISACAs bringing in 223 new members (Table 2.). The original two villages increased their 
own membership by 87 members. Growth was lower in 1990 (57.6 percent), the year no new 
VISACA was launched. However, in 1991, with the addition ofTabanani, the most recently created 
VISACA, total membership increased 65 percent from 1990. Another 6 percent increase was 
recorded within the first three months of operation in 1992. 
Table 1. and Figure 1 show the growth trend of the membership in VISACAs from their 
creation in 1988 up to March 1992. The growth multiple ratio in column 6 of Table 2 obtained by 
dividing the cumulative total membership as of March 1992 by the total membership recorded back 
in December 1989 gives a better insight into the pattern of growth that might be anticipated in the 
future for all VISACAs. For the five VISACAs then in operation, a total growth multiple of 2.8 
suggests that for the two year and three months to come, VISACAs will at best triple their original 
membership if they are to emulate their past growth. It is evident that any particular VISACA 
realizes much of its membership growth in the very first year of its creation, capturing up to 30 
percent or more of the total economically active adult population in their village. The total 
membership recorded by the VISACAs as of December 1991, shows that up to 52 percent of the 
villagers are members in some VISACAs and, on average, one-third of the villagers in all the six 
villages are VISACA members (Table 3). If we bear in mind that 30 to 40 percent of the total 
population consists of minors, then (taking a 35 percent average for the non-active population) 
VISACA membership accounts for 45 percent of the adult economically active age group. 
Women have shown a strong participation in the VISACAs. By March 1992, women repre-
sented 51 percent of the total membership of all six VISACAs. They recorded a membership growth 
of 72 percent from 1990 to 1991 compared to a male membership increase of 59 percent over the 
same period for all six VISACAs (Table 4). Women form the majority in the two Sarahole villages 
(60 percent and 59 percent respectively). However, they represented only 19 percent of the Fula 
village's membership. We do not have any unique evidence to explain the reasons behind the 
relative predominance of women in the two Sarahole villages where curiously most men are 
involved in trading and therefore, one would expect these men to use the VISACA loan services to 
meet their cash flow. In the Fula village, the unusually low participation from women (19 percent) 
reflects the overall low village population, i.e., only a small percentage of the village (16 percent) 
are VISACA members. Table 4 and Figure 2 also highlight the relative growth by gender from 
December 1989 to March 1992. Overall the growth multiples indicate that both men and women 
members increased almost three fold (2.8 and 2.9 respectively) over this period of two years and 
three months. However female membership grew much more rapidly in only two VISACAs. Male 
membership grow more rapidly than female membership in two other VISACAs. The data in Table 
2 also shows that Ahallulie and Madina are the rapid growth VISACAs overall while the remaining 
three are the slow growth associations. 
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III. VISACA SA VIN GS AND CREDIT FLOWS 
1. Savin~s Flows 
A. Membership Participation and Savings Accumulation Through Time 
The VISACAs started collecting deposits in 1988 and by December 1991, members with 
three, six and nine month savings accounts represented 47.4 percent of the total membership (Table 
5). The most popular savings instrument among the membership is the six months term deposit. 
Twenty three percent of the membership held these accounts. On the other hand, current accounts 
(demand deposits) recorded a relatively low 6 percent membership participation (Table 5). This low 
percentage of current accounts held by members is no doubt a reflection of the low demand for an 
account that pays no interest and is only accessible once a week (i.e. VISACAs are only open for one 
day a week, hence current account deposits can only be withdrawn once a week). 
By December 1991, a total of 399,693 dalasis had been mobilized cumulatively from their 
inception by all six VISACAs in 698 demand deposits and savings accounts (see Table 6). At an 
average exchange rate of 1.00 dollar= 8 dalasis (the dollar exchange rate went from 6.50 dalasis in 
1988 to 9 .00 dalasis in 1992), this amounts to a savings inflow of $49, 961.6 dollars. Deposits in all 
accounts range from 10 dalasis to a maximum of 7,000 dalasis. The relative importance of the four 
principal deposit accounts varies by VISACA and, as can be seen in Table 7, three month term 
deposits were the most popular deposit instrument in Village l (Wolot) and Village 2 (Mandinka) 
(63.6 and 43.2 percent respectively). Members preferred six month term deposit accounts in Village 
4 (Mandinka) and Village 6 (Sarahole) (43.8 and 45.7 percent). Nine month term deposits were 
favored in Village 3 (Fula) and Village 5 (Sarahole) and accounted for 58.1 percent and 45 .2 percent, 
respectively, of all accumulated deposit funds over this period. Overall all VISACA members from 
all six villages have a relative preference for the six months term deposit account which captured 
33.8 percent of the accumulated deposit flow from 1988 until December 1991. 
Another interesting pattern can be seen in Table 7 in the intertemporal bias for shorter or 
longer term deposit instruments. Village 1 and Village 2 are predominately short term VISACAs 
(i.e. the relative weight of current accounts and 3 month deposits is overwhelming in total deposits). 
On the other hand, the other four VISACAs are predominantly associations with a bias for longer 
term deposit instruments (6 or 9 month deposits). This particularly stands out for Village 3 and 
Village 5. One factor seems to lie behind this contrasting intertemporal preference for different 
deposit instruments. The first two VISACA villages mentioned above are not part of the Jahally-
Pacharr Rice Project and therefore do not grow rice. The other four are. Savers cannot afford to lock 
themselves into relatively illiquid savings if they don't have alternative streams of income to service 
their liquidity needs throughout the year. In effect, the rice project creates this liquidity for the four 
longer term VISACAs. They can rely upon two irrigated rice harvests per year while the other two 
non-rice villages cannot. Being subject to much less certain income flows, they must protect their 
liquidity with shorter term deposit instruments. 
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B. Growth of Deposit Outstanding Balances 
Another revealing perspective is the trend in deposit growth over time that can be seen 
through the change in the end of year outstanding balances for the four principal deposit instruments 
for all VISACAs combined since 1988 in Table 8. As of December 1991, a total of 188,006 dalasis 
was outstanding in 485 accounts resulting in an average balance of 388 dalasis per account. The 
growth was a little over three-fold for total outstanding deposits of all VISACAs in Table 8 for the 
two years from January 1st, 1989 through December 31st, 1991. Current account balances grow 
most rapidly (about 8 fold) followed by 6 month deposit balances ( 4 fold) with the longest term 9 
month deposit instrument growing the slowest (2.4 times). As pointed out earlier in the cumulative 
data, the 6 month deposit account was uniformly the most popular savings instrument from 1989 to 
1991, accounting for 43 percent of total deposits in 1989, representing 58 percent in 1990 and 49 
percent in 1991. 
Of all VISACAs, Village 4 ranked first with the largest share of outstanding balances through 
time, capturing 38.4 percent of total outstanding balances for the four years combined (see Table 9 
and Figure 3). Village 6 and Village 5 were second and third with 28. l percent and 23.9 percent 
respectively. Village 1 had only 4 percent of all outstanding deposit balances summed up for four 
years, closely followed by Village 2 with 3.5 percent. Village 3 was last with only 2. l percent 
(Table 9 & Figure 3). Again, the two non-rice project village VISACAs (Village l and Village 2) 
stand out as relatively less secure and less wealthy villages mobilizing a much smaller volume of 
savings deposits. At the same time, Village 3 is the only rice-village that also appears insecure in 
its deposit behavior perhaps because rice constitutes a rather minor part of the villages activity. It 
records the slowest growth in deposits of all villages, has the smallest participation by women and 
the highest number of kafos. It is also the village most involved in cattle raising activity (a classic 
male occupation). Among other things, this suggests that an agricultural base to village lite leads 
to more regular income flows and savings than one based on livestock herding. 
It is still too early to draw any definite conclusions about the seasonality of deposits in the 
VISACAs because no definite pattern is evident in the data. However, the economic environment 
in the Sapu area and the VISACA villages is a useful barometer to make a few predictions. In all 
villages, deposits should be expected between February and May when groundnuts are sold. In the 
months after the groundnut season, commonly called the trade season (June to January), little money 
would be collected in VISACA villages where irrigated rice is not grown. The only remaining 
source of income for villagers would, therefore, come from secondary off-farm activities like trade 
and handicrafts. On the other hand, villages actively engaged in the Jahally-Pacharr irrigated rice 
project (Village 3, and especially Village 4, Village 5 and Village 6) and enjoying two harvests of 
rice a year would be able to maintain a less seasonal pattern of deposits throughout the year. In 
general, for these villages, deposits would increase again by August and September as the dry season 
rice harvest is sold. 
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2. Loan Disbursement in the VISACAs 
A. Credit Flows Through Time and Term Matching Practices 
Most VISACA members list loans as the primary reason for joining the association. Lending 
is an important part of the VISACAs' operation and access to loans is valued highly. Despite what 
some may think of as high interest rates ( 40 and 60 percent), the VISACA loan rates compare 
favorably to village money lender rates that can reach 140 percent. The confidentiality involved in 
individual loan disbursement is another feature members like about the VISACA. 
Since the VISACAs began granting loans in 1989, a total of 366,709 dalasis (45,838.6 
dollars) have been issued cumulatively to 1266 members as of December 1991 resulting in an 
average loan size of 290 dalasis or about 36 U.S. dollars equivalent (see Table 10, columns 8 and 
12). The average loan term for all loans issued during this period has been 156 days (five months) 
which, not surprisingly, is approximately one month less than the preferred deposit term length. As 
a general policy, all VISACAs try to match the term structure of a given volume of loans with that 
of a comparable volume of deposits so as to be able to service withdrawals. Moreover, to instigate 
the savings habits of their membership, some VISACAs now require a one-time deposit for members 
to be eligibk for future loans. The proportion of people who receive a loan is still very much 
dependent on membership involvement through savings accounts activities that comprises the loan 
pool. Consequently, 48.3 percent of the members were issued 630 loans in 1991. very much in line 
with a total participation of 4 7.4 percent of the members holding the 619 existing savings accounts 
at the same time. 
The term matching feature so characteristic of VISACAs deserves more comment. Any 
financial institution must be prepared to engage in responsible liquidity or cash flow management. 
Loan repayments must be scheduled in such a way as to facilitate deposit withdrawals. Moreover, 
this must be programmed so that possible delays in repayments do not lead to a liquidity crunch (i.e. 
an inability to service regularly scheduled deposit withdrawals or renewals). The VISACAs protect 
themselves from this risk through two mechanisms: the high interest rate margins pointed out earlier 
and the staggered scheduling of loan terms for a period shorter than the deposit instrument 
supporting this lending. The twenty point margin between deposit and loan rates generates 
substantial net interest earnings to contribute to the funds needed to cover deposit withdrawals in the 
face oflate loan repayments. At the same time, a given volume of three month deposits are drawn 
upon to support a comparable volume of loans but staggered or shortened to two months or less in 
term, six month deposits support loans at five month terms or less, etc. In this way, VISACAs are 
able to meet obligated term deposit withdrawals when they mature except in the case of extreme loan 
delinquency, a rare event in most VISACAs. 
B. The External Funding Issue 
The VISACAs were able to mobilize 304,098 dalasis from their savings accounts (excluding 
current accounts which are not used for loans) while, as pointed out above, 366,709 dalasis were 
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issued cumulatively to members as loans. The shortfall in funding was obtained through external 
funds in June 1991. External donors lent to the VISACAs' management at 11 percent annual interest 
rate for nine months. The management in turn lent to two VISACA villages at the same 11 percent 
interest rate for the same nine months maturity (without revealing the source of the fund). Each 
village then lent to its respective members at 40 and 60 percent annual interest rates for eight 
months. Borrowers thus paid an effective 27 and 40 percent interest on their eight months loans. For 
the first experiment with donor funds, the margin for VISACAs was 18.4 percent [( 40% x 8/12)-
(11 % x 9/12)] and 31.75 percent [(60% x 8/12)-(11 % x 9/12)] respectively. In fact, Village 5 has 
seen a dramatic increase in the number of loans granted from 101 loans in 1990 to 234 loans in 1991, 
after receiving this injection of outside money. Village 4 also received some of this money. This 
volume of outside money was placed in nine month deposits with loans going out for eight months 
terms, thereby lengthening the term maturity (term transformation) beyond the more common five 
month term supported by locally mobilized deposits. Among other things, this increases the proba-
bility that more loans could be issued for agricultural operations that have longer gestation periods 
than the short-term trading activities typically supported by VISACA deposits. In practice, however, 
many of these long term loans were paid off early following the harvests of groundnuts and rice in 
December and January. It would appear they were used to smooth consumption expenditures over 
the period June-December and then paid off with harvest proceeds. 
This external funding of loan activity raises some important questions. Outside funds can 
make a contribution to VISACAs through allowing them an opportunity to expand their loan activity 
beyond the level of their deposit resources. At the same time, it allows lending for longer term 
loans, thereby opening up the possibility of incorporating more agricultural loans in the portfolio that 
heretofore had been dominated more by trading loans. Because these loans were granted at a time 
when people were in need of seeds and fertilizer for their upland fields (end of May 1991 ), it is not 
unlikely that these loans directly supported agricultural undertakings. They also probably played the 
equally valuable role of smoothing the cash flows for consumption over this period. In any event, 
the fungible nature of financial inflows and outflows make it difficult to identify the probable use 
of funds. No doubt they were used for a variety of purposes. More important for our discussion is 
that this external funding can also introduce a donor virus into a healthy local savings and loan 
effort. The careful loan evaluation and loan recovery practices can quickly collapse into a "take the 
money and run" psychology since it is not the villagers own money (or the savings of their 
neighbors). In short, borrowers would not encounter any severe sanction in not repaying externally 
financed loans. 
The VISACAs, fortunately, have carefully and laboriously established their indigenous 
village-based and village-run identity based on village savings. Hence loan recovery (as we shall 
see shortly) has been reasonable. The gradual introduction of some outside funding could possibly 
allow these associations to expand their loan activities and engage in some term transformation as 
long as the relative share of outside money remains a distinctly minor share of total funding and is 
not associated with any earmarked or targeted loan scheme. Targeting merely signals borrowers that 
the money comes from outside resources and, not surprisingly, it is precisely this part of the 
association's loan portfolio that would then not be repaid. Currently outside money has reached 
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almost 10 percent (9.86 percent) of total funding. Fortunately, all these loans were repaid by March 
1992, indicating that the experiment worked successfully this one time. Nevertheless, it would be 
risky to increase this outside funding much beyond the 20 percent range without placing at risk the 
VISACAs' incentive structure for repayment and saturating the market for secure lending 
opportunities in these villages. 
C. Loan Practices and Characteristics of the Loan Portfolio 
Loans are granted on a first-come, first-served basis according to available funds. The 
VISACA loan committee makes the final decision on loan approval and the amount approved. 
Collateral, often in the form of livestock or farm implements and gold jewelry for women, is 
required to secure a loan. Moreover, field interviews suggest that this collateral is linked to a 
sufficiently credible local enforcement milieu within the village to ensure good loan repayment. 
Most loan applicants indicate trading as the purpose of their request although loans are issued for 
a wide variety of other purposes. The VISACAs do not engage in loan targeting. They quickly 
realized that money is fungible and consumption credit is just as productive as any other loan. 
Indeed, the availability of consumption loans can smooth out consumption flows throughout the 
year, thereby releasing personal savings to be used for investment purposes rather than consumption. 
In brief, the availability of consumption loans can be a form of insurance that guarantees 
consumption levels, thereby leading indirectly to an increase in investment through the borrowers 
savings. 
In the year 1991 alone, 630 loans were granted to 48.3 percent of the total membership of 
the six VISACAs. Loan sizes in the VISACAs range from a low ten dalasis to a maximum of3,000 
dalasis and loan duration never exceeds a year. According to a CIDR report in 1990, most loans 
went out for trade purposes as 56 to 97 percent of VISA CA loans were given out to shopkeepers, 
for petty trade, sale of coarse grain, and cattle trading (CIDR, 1990). The high share of loans for 
trading activity and fewer loans for farming was explained by the presence of other NGOs in the area 
(Action Aid) and the Jahally-Pacharr Project that specialized in granting fertilizer and farm 
equipment loans at very low interest rates. Given the relatively short term loans in the VISACAs 
(more commonly three to six months), most loans would not be expected to support agricultural 
production that has a longer seasonal gestation. Many loans are used to finance village trading 
activity in which the inventory turnover of goods is consistent with the shorter term structure and 
where trade margins can support the higher interest rate than those commonly associated with 
agriculture. 
Women account for 52 percent of total VISACA membership and are equally well 
represented in the loan portfolio. VISACA female members received 659 loans as of December 
1991 which accounted for 52 percent of the 1266 total loans cumulatively granted to all members 
from the inception of the VISACAs (Table 11 ). Loans requested by women are mainly for petty 
trade and handicrafts, according to the same 1990 CIDR report, and based on some information from 
one of the VISACAs' files. For three consecutive years from 1989 onwards, more than 50 percent 
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of all loans were issued to women while, on average, 40 percent of the total female membership of 
the VISACAs has been able to secure a VISACA loan.2 
IV. LOAN RECOVERY PERFORMANCE 
Table 12 documents loan disbursement and loan recovery for the VISACAs for all 954 loans 
issued and due for repayment from January 1st 1989 through December 31st 1991. All due dates 
for repayment fell within this three year period. Five VISACAs had complete information on loan 
disbursements and loan recovery. Since Village 2 began operations only in 1991, none of its 29 
loans issued in 1991 fell due during this year. One VISACA, Village 3, issued 50 loans during this 
two year period, however, the research team was unable to secure any information on the loan 
repayment status of these loans. 
Therefore, based on the information on the four VISACAs that had a documented history of 
loan disbursements and loan recovery from January 1989 through December 31st 1991, the overall 
repayment rate was an outstanding 94.4 percent by number of loans and 94. 7 percent by the volume 
of loans (Table 12, column 8). The best performing VISACAs were Village 6 and Village 1 with 
a remarkable 97 percent loan recovery rate over this three year period. The lowest repayment was 
recorded by Village 5 at 90 and 92 percent a still very fine performance. For the VISACAs as a 
whole, some delay in loan repayment is a very common phenomenon, as Senegalese purchasers have 
taken 4 to 6 months to pay Gambian farmers for their groundnuts. This suggests that VISACAs may 
well be playing an interesting insurance role by allowing these groundnut producers and traders, 
along with other borrowers, more flexible loan terms to repay their loans somewhat later than 
scheduled. 
Table 13 highlights this issue in detail through documentation of the time profile of loan 
repayments for all 906 loans in the four VISACAs discussed above. Overall roughly 3 7 percent of 
all loans due were repaid promptly or in advance whereas 36 percent of the loans were repaid one 
month late, approximately 16 percent between one and three months late, and 4.3 percent more than 
three months late (panel B, column 7). It is interesting to note that a significant part of all loans (30 
percent) were repaid early. As mentioned earlier, no repayment information was available on the 
Village 3 VISACA which has had a sluggish operation for some time now, recording the lowest 
share of village membership and the slowest growth of all VISACAs, while more investigation of 
this VISACA is called for, oral evidence in field interviews suggest that most all loans have been 
repaid. 
In summary, the VISACAs, record outstanding repayment records over this three year period. 
No other formal or NGO financial intermediary in The Gambia can match this performance with the 
2 It is important to point out that kafos have become less important in VISA CA loan activity. Kafos very rarely 
apply for loans, but they participated in an important way in the savings effort, particularly at the beginning of the 
VISACAs. Individual kafo members are now more commonly applying for individual loans to satisfy their needs. 
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possible exception of the BICI and SCBG, but no data on loan recovery or arrears are publicly 
available for these private banks, hence comparisons are not possible. Furthermore, judged on the 
risks inherent in the VISACAs portfolio with an overwhelming low income rural constituency, the 
above performance stands out as a remarkable achievement. 
To place this in a relevant context, the credit union movements in Togo and the Cameroon 
are frequently pointed to as the outstanding success stories for non-bank financial intermediaries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, the Togo movement in 1986 after 20 years of history and donor support 
still registered 18 percent of its loan balances as more than one year overdue. (Cuevas, 1989). 
Another pertinent performance indicator is the rate of return of the VISACA loan portfolio. 
This was estimated for the VISACAs for the calendar year 1991 (see Table 14). Overall the five 
VISACAs register a 26 percent weighted average annual rate of return, a promising result reflecting 
the solvency of the movement during this period. Village 3 registers the highest annual rate of return 
( 40 percent). This grows out of its higher average annual interest rate (60 percent) vis-a-vis the other 
VISACAs in the table and the fact that a larger majority of its loan portfolio was issued for a longer 
term (8 months or more) leading to a higher average annualized interest rate compared to other 
VISACAs (where 5 to 6 month term loans were more common). 
A final indicator of the remarkable performance of the VISACAs is its loan deposit ratio of 
100 percent, i.e. the term matching practice of the VISACAs for loan and deposits, excluding 
demand deposits, means they operate with a one-to-one loan deposit ratio. This ratio is much higher 
than that characteristic of credit unions worldwide (50 to 60 percent) who hold much of their savings 
in deposit accounts in branches of banks rather than using them for loans. Similarly, this ratio is 
much higher than that of the private banks in The Gambia (33 percent) who allocate most of their 
deposit resources into T-bills or other non-loan assets. This high ratio for the VISACAs implies a 
"no reserve" policy for time deposits, a seemingly risky practice. However, since 100 percent 
reserves are held on demand deposits this compensates for no reserves held on time deposits. 
V. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The single most important feature behind the VISACAs success is the local savings 
mobilization dimension that has nurtured and expanded the funding base from its inception in 1988 
to the present. This feature quickly established the legitimacy of these young associations. It meant 
that villagers controlled their own association, guaranteed their autonomy in decision making and 
introduced a moral authority for responsible loan administration and loan recovery of their own 
funds. This locally mobilized resource base clearly created the environment for local village 
assemblies to meet and discuss such questions as the composition and responsibilities of the 
management committees and the establishment of interest rate policies and composition of savings 
instruments. 
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Six important operational features have come out of these discussions and have shaped the 
positive performance of the VISACAs since their inception. First, the depositors were paid positive 
real rates of interest on their savings and borrowers have paid positive rates on their loans. 
Moreover, the effective interest rate earned on deposits and paid for loans are higher than those 
earned and paid in the formal financial markets of The Gambia in Banjul. This is an important 
lesson underscoring the fact that rural borrowers in fact can and do pay 20 to 30 percent interest rates 
on 6 month loans (based on 40 to 60 percent annualized rates). On the savings side, depositors in 
the VISACAs earn substantially more on their savings than do depositors in formal banks. Six 
month deposits (the most commonly held deposit instrument) earn either 10 or 15 percent interest 
(based on annualized deposit rates of 40 to 60 percent). Banks at best pay 12 to 14 percent 
annualized interest on time deposits. 
Second, loans are not targeted in the VISACAs. Since outside money played no initial role 
in the funding base for on-lending, villages had the autonomy to decide whether loans should be 
targeted in any way or remain untargeted with management committees servicing loan requests on 
a first come, first serve basis. They decided on the latter course of action with positive results in the 
end as a diversified loan portfolio contributed to good loan recovery. 
Third, short term loans of six months or less have predominated in the VISACAs. Only a 
few loans beyond 9 months have been made. Among other things, this implies that trading activity, 
artisan activities and handicrafts, and other non-agricultural activities will necessarily have to play 
an important role in any village banking initiative. These activities generate value added in their 
own right, are more suited to shorter term finance and can cover the interest rate charges with their 
earnings. Nevertheless, some farming loans are made, especially to the rice irrigated farmers who 
benefit from a two harvest season. More importantly, farm families are involved in many of the off-
farm and non-farm activities mentioned above and clearly benefit from VISACA loans. Forcing 
targeted loans into what are misleadingly called "productive" activities is a misplaced and 
counterproductive effort often undertaken by donors. It is refreshing to see the VISACAs have been 
unencumbered by this typical form of donor intervention. 
Fourth, the VISACAs have managed their assets and liabilities intelligently by carefully 
matching the term structure of loans and deposits in a consistent fashion to meet liquidity demand. 
This is an extremely important lesson that should be followed by all village based savings and loan 
initiatives. These organizations must calibrate the cash flow derived from their loan repayment 
schedules to meet the term schedule of deposit withdrawals. Among other things, this implies that 
several deposit instruments should be made available so that several loan term maturities can be 
offered to meet loan demand consistent with these deposit term instruments. The VISACAs have 
shown that a safety cushion should also be programmed into this term matching exercise to cover 
for the fact that some loans may be repaid with delays. Hence, loan maturities are typically issued 
for slightly shorter terms (usually one month) than the deposit term obligation supporting them. 
The fifth operational feature that comes out of the VISA CA experience is the important role 
of collateral. Farm equipment and livestock were the typical forms of collateral pledged by 
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borrowers. Management committees take these pledges responsibly and will take possession of the 
collateral of seriously delinquent borrowers. The important lesson here is that the credibility of local 
enforcement of collateral obligations will only work when it is based on local savings (that are not 
being repaid) and when local officials support these actions as ethical and proper. It would appear 
that the threat of taking collateral is sufficiently credible in the VISACA villages to encourage 
responsible loan repayment behavior. 
Last but not least of all the features is the self-management approach to the VISACAs. The 
successful experience here has proven once again that villagers can be and should be given more, 
if not full responsibilities to manage their own finances. Along with these six operational features 
are two important lessons from the donor program design for the VISACAs that merit discussion. 
First, the VISACA donors were only interested in setting up VISACAs where there was substantial 
non-agricultural activity (or conversely, an amply funded region-specific agricultural development 
project that generates substantial non-agricultural income streams). This grows out of a concern that 
a local village savings and loan effort could not hope to pay savers an attractive return on savings 
through interest earnings from loans primarily based on agricultural activity alone. The loans are 
too risky, the returns too problematical, and the term maturity too long to service 3 to 6 month 
deposit instruments that would be required to attract local savings. People in rural areas cannot 
afford to lock up their savings for 12 month periods, and certainly not for interest rates as low as the 
average rate of return to farming in these settings (adjusted for risk and default). This is an 
extremely important lesson for any NGO effort designed to issue loans through locally mobilized 
savings in rural Gambia. 
The second important lesson of program design in the VISA CA experience is to appreciate 
the logic of a two stage sequence of donor involvement in promoting local savings and credit 
associations. In the first stage, donor support was focused on promotion, technical assistance, and 
training, with a long term resident advisor working closely with the VISACAs. No external funding 
was provided for on-lending. The objective was to promote properly remunerated local savings 
deposits as the exclusive base for on-lending, thereby ensuring local identity and local control and 
autonomy in decision making, both of which are essential ingredients for promoting responsible loan 
recovery. 
The second stage, some three to four years later, allows for some donor funding to be used 
for on-lending through the vehicle of 9 month or 1 year deposits. This expands the base for on-
lending beyond the limits set by the local deposit base. More importantly, it extends term 
transformation into longer term loans than would be possible with locally based term deposits. The 
loan activity that grows out of this action is untargeted and therefore blends into the generalized 
practices used for other loans. Still, there is little likelihood that these longer term loans would move 
substantially into agriculture if borrowers have to pay 40 to 60 percent annualized interest charges 
(depending on the VISA CA). It is unlikely that any agricultural activity earns that kind of return in 
The Gambia. An important caveat to this second stage is to limit the volume of outside funding for 
on-lending to no more than 15 to 20 percent of total lending sources. Otherwise, the image of local 
identity, local control and, most importantly, local savings could become jeopardized as a donor 
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virus contaminates the portfolio with an entitlement or dole psychology, and borrowers "take the 
money and run." 
The next stage of the VISA CA movement is the most challenging, namely, expanding the 
movement into a larger number of villages in several other regions of the country. This action could 
begin to create a network of VISACAs that, in effect, would generate scale, scope and spatial 
economies and possible linkages to the banking system. This would occur only if a second level 
regional federation would emerge that could play a role in intermediating between surplus and deficit 
units within the movement, become a lender of last resort, and a service center for auditing and other 
technical assistance. It may be premature to expect this to emerge in the immediate future. 
However, it is not an unreasonable long term objective as long as there are other regions in The 
Gambia that can generate the income streams for savings mobilization comparable to those generated 
by the Jahally-Pacharr project. 
The current discussion about setting up a regional training center for NGOs to expand the 
VISACA experiment to other regions is opportune and potentially promising. It is time for NGOs 
to sit down and discuss the lessons learned from the VISACA experience. It is also opportune to 
identify the information needed to design and launch new VISACA initiatives. Finally, it is 
pertinent to spell out the type and magnitude of start up (non-loan) subsidies that are needed to 
launch viable long term village banks. In this regard, heavy expenditures on literacy, numeracy and 
bookkeeping training are required in large part because the Gambian government has failed to invest 
in basic schooling in the countryside. 
The issue that surfaces at this point is whether an initiative of this scope and magnitude 
combined with other international donors would preempt the perceived role of TANGO currently 
envisioned in the rest of the NGO community in The Gambia. At the very least, it could represent 
a parallel effort emulating many of the roles and functions currently under discussion in TANGO. 
The contrasting operational philosophies between the VISACAs, on the one hand, and other NGO 
operators in The Gambia, on the other hand, perhaps have led to this separate independent stance. 
Nevertheless, it would be in the interest of TANGO officials to encourage the VISACAs from their 
current observer status, to advise the TANGO movement and play a decisive role in shaping 
T ANGOs agenda. The VISACAs are the only entity in The Gambia that has created a viable, village 
based savings and credit movement. It would be wise for the TANGO to build on this experience 
and incorporate the VISACA group to play a meaningful role in designing TANGO's future. 
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Table 1. Individual and Group (Kafo) Membership on a Cumulative End of Year Basis by Visaca and 
Gender from 1988 to March 1992. 
L988 
VISA CA MALE FEMALE KAFO TOTAL 
Village 1 0 0 0 0 
Village 2 0 0 0 0 
Village 3 22 17 40 
Village 4 0 0 0 0 
Village 5 0 0 0 0 
Village 6 70 79 3 152 
TOTAL 92 80 20 192 
1989 
VISACA MALE FEMALE KAFO TOTAL 
Village 1 14 2 17 
Village 2 0 0 0 0 
Village 3 34 10 20 64 
Village 4 34 48 1 83 
Village 5 57 61 5 123 
Village 6 81 129 5 215 
TOTAL 220 250 32 502 
1990 
VISACA MALE FEMALE KAFO TOTAL 
Village 1 37 31 3 71 
Village 2 0 0 0 0 
Village 3 39 12 21 72 
Village 4 66 83 4 153 
Village 5 133 132 5 270 
Village 6 85 134 6 225 
TOTAL 360 392 39 791 
1991 
VISA CA MALE FEMALE KAFO TOTAL 
Village 1 73 61 4 138 
Village 2 68 82 8 158 
Village 3 51 17 21 89 
Village 4 106 102 8 216 
Village 5 179 265 7 451 
Village 6 97 149 7 253 
TOTAL 574 676 55 1305 
1992 
VISA CA MALE FEMALE KAFO TOTAL 
Village 1 77 62 4 143 
Village 2 95 106 9 210 
Village 3 52 17 21 90 
Village 4 112 106 8 226 
Village 5 179 269 7 455 
Village 6 97 156 7 260 
TOTAL 612 716 56 1384 
Source: VISACA files. 
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Table 2. Annual Profile of End of Year Total Membership for all VISACAs from December 1988 to 
March 1992. 
1988 1989 1990 1991 March Growth 
1992 MultiEle1 
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Village l 0 17 71 138 143 8.4 
Village 2 0 0 0 158 210 
Village 3 40 64 72 89 90 l.4 
Village 4 0 83 153 216 226 2.7 
Village 5 0 123 270 451 455 3.7 
Village 6 152 215 225 253 260 l.2 
Total 192 502 791 1305 1384 2.8 
Percent Change 161.5 57.6 65.0 6.1 
Source: Table III-1. 









Source: Table 1. 
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Figure 1. 
Individual and Group (Kafo) Membership Evolution 






































Source: Data on village population were obtained from a CIDR report. 


















Source: Table 1. 
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Female Participation in the VISACAs' Cumulative Membership as of March 1992 and Growth 
Multiples for Male and Female Members from December 1989 to March 1992. 
March 1992 March 1992 Growth Multiple1 (March 
1992/December 1989) 
Total Membershi2 3 Female Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
143 43.4 5.5 31.0 
210 50.5 
90 18.9 1.5 1.7 
226 47.0 3.3 2.2 
455 59.1 3.1 4.4 
253 60.0 1.2 1.2 
1384 51.7 2.8 2.9 
Note 1: The growth multiples are the ratio of total membership as of March 1992 to membership as of December 
1989. 
Source: Tables 1. and 3. 
Figure 2. 
Relative Size of Membership by Gender in all VISACAs 
as of March 1992 
%) 
Table 5. Number of Deposit Accounts and Percent of Membership as Depositors for the Four Principal Deposit Accounts by VISACA, December 
1991. 
Number of Accounts and Percent Membershi~ Holding These Accounts 
Current % 3 months % 6 months % 9 months % 
Account Membership Deposit Membership Deposit Membership Deposit Membership 
VISA CA Account' Accounts' Account' 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Village 1 16 11.6 27 19.6 4 2.9 1 0.7 
Village 2 15 9.5 17 10.8 6 3.2 0 0.0 
Village 3 0 0.0 17 19.1 17 19.1 6 6.7 
Village 4 23 10.6 45 20.8 145 67.1 28 13.0 
Village 5 11 2.4 22 4.9 69 15.3 63 14.0 
Village 6 14 5.5 65 25.7 65 25.7 22 8.7 
TOTAL 79 6.1 193 14.8 306 23.4 120 9.2 
Source: VISACA files. 











Volume of Deposits (in Dalasis) Accumulated Through Time from the Inception of Each 
VISACA to December 1991 in the Four Principal Deposit Accounts by VISACA. 
Deposit Accounts 1 
Current 3 Month 6 Month 9 Month Total 
Account De2osit De2osit De2osit De2osit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
14,765 40,141 3,200 5,000 63,106 
4,312 5,335 2,700 0 12,347 
0 2,787 2,585 7,435 12,807 
29,048 17,360 48,338 15,625 110,371 
14,471 7,065 25,216 38,532 85,284 
32,999 19,913 52,921 9,945 115,778 
95,595 92,601 134,960 76,537 399,693 
Source: VISACA files. 










Source: Table 6. 
Relative Importance of the Volume of Deposits in the Four Principal Deposit Accounts 
Accumulated Through Time from the Inception of Each VISACA to December 1991 by 
VISA CA. 
Volume ofDe2osits (%) 
Current 3 Month 6 Month 9 Month Total 
Account De2osit De2osit De2osit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
23.4 63.6 5.1 7.9 100.0 
34.9 43.2 21.9 0.0 100.0 
0.0 21.8 20.2 58.1 100.0 
26.3 15.7 43.8 14.2 100.0 
17.0 8.3 29.6 45.2 100.0 
28.5 17.2 45.7 8.6 100.0 

















Outstanding Balances for all VISACAs Combined by the Four Principal Deposit Accounts, 
from 1988 to 1991. 
Current Accounts 3 month term deposits 6 month term de!!!:!sits 
Average 
# Amount Balance1 # 
Average Average 
Amount Balance1 # Amount Balance' 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
0 0 0.0 4 5,780 1,445.0 0 0 0.0 
1,502 1,502.0 18 1,395 77.5 11 11,155 1,014.1 
18 2,040 113.3 38 12,345 324.9 102 40,774 399.7 
43 117,511 2,732.8 19 4,142 218.0 127 42,948 338.2 
62 15,293 246.7 79 23,662 299.5 240 94,877 395.3 
43 7.8 1.1 3.0 11.5 3.9 
9 month term deposits Total 
# Amount Averase Balance' # Amount Averase Balance' 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
0 0 0.0 4 5,780 1,445.0 
15 11,720 781.3 45 25,772 572.7 
34 14,623 430.1 192 69,782 363.4 
55 27,831 506.0 244 86,672 355.2 
104 54,174 520.9 485 188,006 387.6 
3.7 2.4 5.4 3.4 
Note l: Average is obtained by dividing total volume by the number of accounts. 
2: Growth multiple is obtained by dividing total balance in 1991 by total balance in 1989. 
Table 9. Volume of Outstanding Deposit Balances for All Four Deposit Accounts by VISACA from 1988 
to December 1991. 
1988 1989 1990 1991 Total 
Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding 
VISA CA Deeosits Deeosits Deeosits Deeosits Deeosits % Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Village 1 0 0 1270 6291 7561 4.0 
Village 2 0 0 0 6670 6670 3.5 
Village 3 250 570 1180 1935 3935 2.1 
Village 4 0 5920 30840 35415 72175 38.4 
Village 5 0 10417 17786 16715 44918 23.9 
Village 6 5530 8865 18706 19646 52747 28.1 
Total 5780 25772 69782 86672 188006 100.0 
Source: VISACA files. 
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Figure 3. 
Share of Cumulative Outstanding Deposit Balances for 1988 through December 1991. 
"' 
r;;; age 1 (4o/o) 
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Table 10. Total Value of Loans Issued, Average Loan Size in Dalasis, and Tenn Maturity (in Days) by 
VISACA from 1989 to 1991. 
1989 1990 1991 Total 
VISA CA No. of Total No. of Total No. of Total No. of Total 
Loans Value Loans Value Loans Value Loans Value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Village 11 0 0 33 18,540 87 25,986 120 44,526 
Village 22 0 29 2760 29 2,760 
Village 3 11 2770 7 1400 32 8930 50 13,100 
Village 4 62 4810 193 44,290 151 52,013 406 101,113 
Village 5 52 9320 101 29,980 234 70,050 387 109,350 
Village 6 84 21,545 93 30,405 97 43,910 274 95,860 
Total 209 38,445 427 124,61 630 203,64 1,266 366,709 
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Average Loan Size (in Dalasis)3 Avera~e Term (in da~s)4 
1989 1990 1991 1989 1990 1991 
VISA CA Average Average Average Total Total 
Loan Loan Loan Ave. Average Average Average Ave. 
Size Size Size Size Term Term Term Term 
(9) (IO) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Village 11 562 299 371 85 157 137 
Village 22 95 95 121 121 
Village 3 252 200 279 262 87 139 195 163 
Village 4 78 229 344 249 109 134 170 145 
Village 5 179 297 299 283 167 152 207 187 
Village 6 256 327 453 350 129 151 138 140 
All VISACAs 184 292 323 290 131 138 176 156 
Source: VISACA files. 
Note 1: No loans were granted in 1989 in Village 1. 
2: Village 2 was not yet in operation in 1989 and 1990. 
3: Average loan size is obtained by dividing amount of loans issued by the number of loans issued. 
4: Average term is obtained by dividing total number of days associated with all loans issued by the total 
number of loans issued. 
Table 11. Selected Indicators of Women's Access to VISACA Loans from 1989 through 1991 by VISACA. 
VISA CA Membership Female #of Loans % of members #of Females % of Female % of Loans that went to 
Members Issued with loans who received a members who Women 
loan received a loan (col 5/col 3) 
(col 5/col 2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1991 
Village 1 138 61 87 63.0 39 63.9 44.8 
Village 2 158 82 29 18.4 17 20.7 58.6 
Village 3 89 17 32 36.0 14 82.4 43.8 
Village 4 216 102 151 69.9 77 75.5 51.0 
Village 5 451 265 234 51.9 125 47.2 53.4 
Village 6 253 149 97 38.3 59 39.6 60.8 
TOTAL 1305 676 630 48.3 331 49.0 52.5 
1990 
Village 1 71 31 33 46.5 14 45.2 42.4 
Village 2 
Village 3 72 12 7 9.7 1 8.3 14.3 
Village 4 153 83 193 126.1 106 127.7 54.9 
Village 5 270 132 101 37.4 47 35.6 46.5 
Village 6 225 134 93 41.3 54 40.3 58.1 
TOTAL 791 392 427 54.0 222 56.6 52.0 
1989 
Village 1 17 2 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Village 2 
Village 3 64 10 11 17.2 2 20.0 18.2 
Village 4 83 48 62 74.7 34 70.8 54.8 
Village 5 123 61 52 42.3 28 45.9 53.8 
Village 6 215 129 84 39.1 42 32.6 50.0 
TOTAL 502 250 209 41.6 106 42.4 50.7 
Source: VISACA Files. 
Table 12. Documentation of Loan Recovery by Number of Loans and hy Volume of Loans by VISACA for all Loans Issued from 1989 Onwards 
and Due for Repayment through December 1992. 
Total Loans Issued as of Total Loans Issued and Due by Loans Due and Repaid by Recovery Rate for Loans 
December 1991 December 1991 December 1991 in % 
VISA CA No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Balances 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Village 1 120 44,526 72 37,470 70 36,340 97.2 97.0 
Village 2 29 2,760 0 0 0 0 
Village 31 50 13, 100 48 13,035 
Village 4 406 101,113 324 72,398 307 67,388 94.8 93.1 
Village 5 387 109,350 250 72,775 226 66,975 90.4 92.0 
Village 6 274 95,860 260 88,295 252 85,945 96.9 97.3 
Total 1,266 366,709 954 283,973 855 256,648 94.4 94.7 
Source: VISACA files. 
Note 1: No information was available on Village 3 loan repayment. 
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Table 13. Basic Documentation of Time Profile of Loan Repayments in Terms of Number of Loans and 
Rates of Repayment for Total Number of Loans Issued and Due for Repayment from January 
1st 1989 Through December 31st 1991 by VISACA. 
A. Number of Loans 
Indicator/Schedule Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 Village 4 Village 5 Village 6 Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Loans due 72 0 324 250 260 906 
2. Repaid on time 21 18 8 17 64 
3. Repaid ahead of 19 87 102 65 273 
time 
4. Repaid but less 25 132 67 103 327 
than a month late 
5. Repaid but 1 to 3 5 61 30 46 142 
months late 
6. Repaid but more 0 9 10 20 39 
than 3 months late 
7. Undetermined 0 0 9 10 
length1 
B. Rates of Loan Reea~ment b~ Time Profile of Reea~ments 
l. Prompt recovery 29.2 5.6 3.2 6.5 7.1 
rate (%)2 
2. Early recovery 26.4 26.9 40.8 25.0 30.l 
rate (%)3 
3. Less than a month 34.7 40.7 26.8 39.6 36.1 
arrears rate ( % )4 
4. One to 3 months 6.9 18.8 12.0 17.7 15.7 
arrears rate ( % )4 
5. More than 3 0.0 2.8 4.0 7.7 4.3 
months arrears 
rate (%)4 
6. Undetermined 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.4 1.1 
length recovery 
rate 
7. Total recovery 97.2 94.8 90.4 96.6 94.4 
rate (%)5 
Note 1: Undetermined length refers to loans with no due date listed in VISACA files. 
2: Prompt recovery rate was obtained by dividing the number of loans repaid on time in line 2, panel A, by the 
number of loans due in line 1, panel A. 
3: Early recovery rate was obtained by dividing the number of loans repaid ahead of time (line 3, panel A) by 
the total loans due (line 1, panel A). 
4: Recovery rates for less than one month in arrears, from one to three months in arrears, etc. is based on the 
number of loans finally repaid during these specified periods (lines 4, 5, and 6 in panel A) over the number 
of loans due (line 1). 




Table 14. Annual Rate of Return for the VISACA Portfolio by VISACA for the Calendar Year 1991. 
Average Monthly Average Monthly 
VISACA Loan Balance Interest Earnings2 Monthly Rate of Yearly Rate of 
(in Dalasis) (in Dalasis) Return3 
(1) (2) (3) 
Village 1 8,038.0 149.1 1.9% 
Village 21 
Village 3 5,217.5 174.8 3.4% 
Village 4 29,273.8 632.3 2.2% 
Village 5 38,000.4 775.6 2.0% 
Village 6 19,665.8 450.3 2.3% 
All VISACAs 100, 195.5 2, 182.1 2.2% 
Source: VISACA files. 
Note 1: None of the Village 2 loans were due in 1991. 
2:. Average monthly interest earnings is the sum of monthly interest payments divided by 12. 
3: Monthly rate of return is colunm (2)/colunm (1). 
4: Yearly rate of return is colunm (3)*12. 
Return4 
(4) 
22.3% 
40.8% 
26.4% 
24.5% 
27.5% 
26.4% 
